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An Interdisciplinary Study to Explore Impacts from Policies for the 
Introduction of Low Carbon Vehicles 
Driven by concerns of climate change, governments across the world are 
introducing a number of policies to accelerate the uptake of low carbon vehicles, 
with a specific focus on electric motors. However, there is uncertainty in the 
effectiveness of such policies and technology pathways, which are inherently 
interlinked. This paper considers the short-term situation to 2020 and focuses on 
the concern that these policies may bring about some disproportionate impacts in 
society due to changes in mobility. An ethical framework is established that seeks 
to balance obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and rights to car 
ownership, then selected policies are modelled within this framework to assess 
acceptability of implementation. Although these policies are successful in 
introducing low carbon vehicles and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, findings 
also indicate uneven cost burdens and reduced affordability of car ownership. 
Following this, recommendations for policy amendments and model 
improvements are made. 
Keywords: low carbon; electric vehicles; transport policy; ethics; system 
dynamic modelling 
 
Introduction 
This research addresses concerns that transport greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
reduction policies and the opportunity for car ownership may be in conflict. For over a 
century, car use has continued to grow in developed countries, to a point where car 
ownership is no longer viewed as a luxury by many, but as a necessary part of 
maintaining their current lifestyle. Car ownership is a means to mobility that gives 
many advantages over other modes, including flexibility, time-savings and 
independence. Moreover, with many political decisions regarding transport networks 
and infrastructure since the mid-20th century being biased towards car ownership, some 
journeys are almost impossible without a car.  
However, over the last few decades there has been growing recognition and concern 
over the potential impacts of climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, and one of the major sources is the transport sector, which accounts 
for approximately 15% of global GHG emissions (ITF 2010). As such, governments are 
introducing policies to facilitate a transition to low carbon vehicles (LCVs), which is 
further driven by other policies on local pollution and resource security. Although the 
automobile industry has been very much a free market up until now, these policies are 
being implemented to stimulate the market for LCVs , which consist of small ultra-
efficient conventional (fossil-fuel powered) Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle 
(ICEV) in addition to alternative fuels and powertrains. The policies are particularly 
important as LCV uptake is currently stifled by comparatively high purchase prices 
and/or perceived inferior attributes to current technologies.   
The concern which has driven this work is that although these technologies are 
necessary they, and the policies to promote them, may have a disproportionate negative 
impact on those in society who are already worst off, by reducing their opportunity to 
own a car and thus affect their mobility needs. This research considers the initial 
transition to a low carbon fleet in California, covering a short time period (to 2020) and 
using a unique interdisciplinary approach that seeks to incorporate an ethical framework 
for LCV policy within a System Dynamic model, in order to identify potential impacts 
on both societal inequities and carbon reduction targets. Only once impacts are 
recognised, can they be duly considered in policy appraisal. It should be noted however, 
that in this study we limit ourselves to considering a constant car fleet, and as such does 
not consider indirect effects of changes in car ownership or transport behaviour.  
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, an ethical framework is established which 
argues that governments have obligations to mitigate climate change, but also that these 
must be balanced aJDLQVWLQGLYLGXDOV¶FODLPVWRFDURZQHUVKLSZLWKDIRFXVRQWKRVH
already worst off in society. This is followed by a brief overview of the two policies 
considered in this specific study, which are Californian regulations on automobile 
manufacturers and purchase rebates for customers.  The third section describes the 
methodology applied to a case study model of these policies and then the model outputs 
and findings are presented. Finally, the conclusions from this work are presented, which 
link together the modelling findings and ethical framework, presenting 
recommendations for policy amendments and model improvements.  
The Ethical Framework: A Balancing Act 
Climate Change  
It is widely accepted that humans are responsible for contributing towards climate 
change, and that it will harm a significant number of people across the world, both those 
alive now and future generations (IPPC 2007). The extent that humans can be held 
accountable and how to respond is the more disputed ethical debate. Climate change 
poses a number of philosophical challenges as it addresses responsibility, justice, rights 
and harms   
The gathering catalogue of work on climate change ethics (see, for example, Gardiner et 
al. [2010]) generally agrees that Western governments are morally obliged to take 
action to prevent or restrict carbon emissions and work towards both climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Alongside this there is a weak claim that individuals are 
obliged to reduce personal emissions (Butler 2010; Hourdequin 2010; Nolt 2011) but 
obligations lie more strongly towards ensuring that governments are successful in 
fulfilling their obligations to implementing climate change mitigation policies and, once 
in law, to follow legal policies (Cripps 2011; Sinnot-Armstrong 2005).  
Car Ownership Claims  
The private automobile is seen as an essential part of everyday life for many citizens in 
the western world. To an extent, this is true regardless of class, income, location or 
family and work commitments. The accessibility it provides not only adds value to  
lives through enabling involvement in social activities, but also may be a vital 
instrument in pursuing deeply held convictions, assuring employment and security, and 
allowing a freedom of movement in many other areas important to us as individuals 
(Featherstone, Thrift, and Urry 2005; Lomasky 1997; Rajan 2007). In fact, it is most 
difficult for one to imagine what the world could be like if the car had not been 
invented.  
Since the first cars and roads were introduced around a hundred years ago, 
infrastructure and culture have co-evolved, and while it is outside the scope of this work 
WRJRLQWRWKLVKLVWRU\QXPHURXVSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVKDYHLQGLUHFWO\HQDEOHGLW¶VSODFHLQ
VRFLHW\DOPRVWWRWKHSRLQWRIFUHDWLQJDµORFN-LQ¶WRFDURZQHUVKLSIRUH[DPSOHFXWVWR
rail networks and the building of out-of-town shopping and leisure centres). It may be 
argued that some members of society rely so heavily on their access to a private car, that 
their standard of living may be unfairly reduced if that access is prevented or 
diminished in some way, especially if it contributes to concerns of social exclusion 
(Lucas 2012; SDS 2011). 
As such, there are certain segments of society that may have special or stronger claims 
than others for the preservation of car ownership should policies to decarbonise 
transport impact on the opportunity to do so. This may depend upon personal mobility 
(related to any physical disabilities), current use (reliance on car ownership for 
maintaining social relationships, commitments to work, study, domestic tasks and 
hobbies, availability and cost of other modes of transport) or preference satisfaction 
(some people may simply enjoy driving their car). The short time scale of this work 
reflects the recognised need to move away from private car ownership in the long term. 
For now, the question of whether cars should be allowed at all is one that will be put 
aside, though it is acknowledged that there are many reasons why we may wish to 
remove cars from the roads, from environmental and safety concerns to social inequality 
(Sloman 2006).  
Striking the Balance  
Assuming that harmful anthropogenic climate change is occurring, is wished to be 
avoided (or minimised) and that the automobile makes a significant contribution, then it 
follows that carbon emissions from automobiles must be reduced. As there is currently 
such heavy reliance on the automobile, climate change mitigation policies may 
therefore place unfair burdens on some people, even if in some cases it can be argued to 
be a luxury. This is particularly important for those who are already the most vulnerable 
in society and have strong claims for ownership.  
To reconcile climate change obligations and car ownership claims, this paper assumes a 
long term aim to decarbonise transport, and a short term aim to minimise the negative 
impact on car ownership. This reflects an ethical framework that sees coercive LCV 
policies as permissible (due to the harms of climate change), but requires within this 
protection for those who are already amongst the worst off in terms of mobility 
(Harrison, forthcoming). There are already numerous examples of this type of public 
policy, such as council tax discounts and exemptions, disability access regulations and 
the semi-controlled free market.  
In this research, a system dynamic model of certain policies for low carbon vehicle 
uptake is explored to understand what impacts the tested policies may have on this 
ethical framework, by realising carbon reduction targets and highlighting areas of 
concern regarding inequalities in the opportunity to own a car. The focus is on income 
segments and ownership costs as we have identified suitable proxy indicators for 
income groups in the model.  
Low Carbon Vehicle Uptake Policies 
International LCV policies are driven by GHG reduction goals and managed by the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP 2012) and the World Forum Harmonisation of 
Vehicle Regulations (UNECE 2012). Individual regions and countries then translate 
these into their own laws. Policies cover barriers to LCV uptake on both the demand 
and supply sides. Some may cover both or interact between them ± for example building 
infrastructure assures both consumers and manufacturers of the government 
commitment to a low carbon fleet, whereas vehicle demonstrations are required to build 
consumer confidence in the technologies, which in turn assures manufacturers of a 
viable business case. 
Policies Explored in this Research 
This study assesses the Californian Advanced Clean Cars Program, which combined 
previous vehicle regulations on pollutants with newer initiatives driven by climate 
change. Two policies within this programme are of interest in this paper, Regulations on 
the automobile manufacturer, and Subsidies (or rebates) on purchase prices for the car 
owner. 
The Low and Zero Emission Vehicle Regulations1 classifies ZEVs as Battery Electric 
Vehicles (BEV), Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PiHEV), and (to a lesser extent) 
conventional Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEV).  These Regulations place the onus on the 
manufacturer to reduce the average fleet2 emissions of Green-House Gases (GHGs) 
through producing more LEVs, and sell increasing shares of ZEVs, by imposing civil 
penalties on the manufacturers for non-compliance. These penalties are calculated on 
*+*DQG=(9³FUHGLWV´HDUQHGRYHUDSHULRGYDOXHGDWILQHSHUQHJDWLYH credit 
(over 5 years for GHG and 3 years for ZEV) is incurred. Under the LEV component, 
GHG credits are calculated annually by the difference between the standard government 
target and actual sales weighted fleet emission average. The ZEV credit target for a 
company is a percentage quota of non-ZEV sales from the previous six years and credits 
are awarded to the company for ZEVs produced and sold.  
Secondly we consider the California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project3, This is funded by 
the California Air Resources Board and provides $42m for the period 2009-2013, and is 
expected to be extended until 2015, to give rebates of up to $2500 to customers who 
purchase or lease eligible zero emission or plug-in hybrid vehicles. These are very 
similar to the European Average Fleet Emission Regulations (EC 2012a), which enforce 
fiscal penalties on manufacturers for every extra g/km CO2 over average fleet targets, 
and the UK Plug-in Car Grant (OLEV 2011), which currently gives government 
subsidies of up to £5000 at the point of purchase of eligible plug-in vehicles.  
                                                 
1 Further information on these regulations can be found on the California Air Resources Board 
website: http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/levprog. htm. 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/ zevprog.htm. 
2 This is tailpipe only so includes all ICEV, HEV and PiHEV 
3 Further information is available from the Centre for Sustainable Energy, California: 
http://energycenter.org/index.php/incentive-programs/clean-vehicle-rebate-project. 
Model Methodology  
Previous Studies 
There have many academic studies on modelling the likely uptake of LCVs, and a 
selection of these are set out in Table 1. As can be seen, there is a wide range of 
localities, technologies, modelling approach and study objectives. Most are discrete 
choice models, whereas more complex system models are beginning to be more widely 
studied.  
Study Location 
Alternative 
Fuels and 
Technologies 
Type of 
model Study Objective(s) 
Ahn, Jeong, and 
Kim (2008)  Korea 
CNG, LPG, 
HEV Choice 
Forecast demand (ownership, use, fuel 
consumption, emissions). 
Batley, Toner, and 
Knight (2004)  UK AFV Choice 
Forecast demand, cost elasticities, 
impact of taste variation. 
Beggs, Cardell, and 
Hausman, (1981) UK EV Choice 
Potential consumer demand, 
preference parameters. 
Brownstone et 
al. (1996) California AFV Choice 
Forecast demand, usage and charging 
patterns, including vehicle transactions 
Cao and Mokhtarian 
(2004)  U.S.A 
BF, CNG, 
HEV Diffusion 
Future demand, evaluate influence of 
factors and policies. 
Dagsvike et al. 
(2002) Norway LPG, EV Choice 
Potential demand, elasticities, 
willingness to pay. 
EST (2007)  UK BF, EV, HEV, HFCV, LPG Choice 
Model vehicle parc and policy 
mechanisms, project carbon emissions. 
Greene, Duleep, and 
McManus (2004)  U.S.A HEV Choice 
Market potential and impact on fuel 
economy. 
Janssen et al. 
(2006)  Switzerland NG 
System 
Dynamic 
Estimate market development and 
study reaction to policies. 
Leiby and Rubin 
(1997)  USA 
BF, CNG, 
EV LPG,  
System 
Dynamic 
Identify conditions and associated 
costs for successful market transition. 
Mabit and 
Fosgerau (2011)  Denmark 
BF, BEV, 
HEV, HCFV  Choice Assess potential future demand. 
Potoglou and 
Kanaroglou (2007)  Canada AFV, HEV Choice 
Influences on choice and willingness 
to pay. 
Shepherd, Bonsall, 
and Harrison (2012)  UK BEV, PHEV 
System 
Dynamic 
Considers impacts on future demand 
and carbon emissions. 
Struben and 
Sterman (2008)  California AFV 
System 
Dynamic 
Feedbacks that affect consumer 
awareness of AFV and diffusion. 
Tran et al. 
(2013)  Global 
BEV, HEV,  
HFCV. PHEV 
Energy 
System 
Assess consumer heterogeneity for 
early and mass market adopters. 
Walther et al. 
(2010)  California 
BEV, HEV, 
PHEV  
System 
Dynamic 
Examines manufacturer strategies for 
compliance to emission regulations. 
Table 1: Selected LCV uptake model studies (CNG: Compressed Natural Gas, LPG: 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas, BF: Biofuel, HFCV: Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicle)  
The focus of the studies varies between general AFV forecasting (Ahn, Jeong, and Kim 
2008; Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman. 1981; Greene, Duleep, and McManus 2004) or 
willingness to pay (Batley, Toner, and Knight 2004; Dagsvik et al. 2002; Potoglou and 
Kanarogolou 2007)  to more explicit considerations such as policy development and 
requirements (Cao and Mokhtarian 2004; EST 2007; Janssen et al. 2006; Mabit and 
Fosgerau 2011; Shepherd, Bonsall, and Harrison 2012; Struben and Sterman 2008), 
wider system impacts (such as environmental or energy demands)  (Tran et al. 2013) 
and manufacturer strategies (Walther et al. 2010).  
These studies generally suggest that ICEV will continue to dominate in the immediate 
future due to its current strong and widespread existence and infrastructure, combined 
with higher costs and deficient LCV attributes. Despite this, most studies agree that 
under the right conditions, a slow but successful introduction of LCVs is possible that 
will eventually lead to a decrease in emissions. These conditions vary, but include 
technology improvement without strong government commitment, appropriate timing 
and co-ordinated policy intervention (Cao and Mokhtarian 2004; Tran et al. 2013; 
Batley, Toner, and Knight 2004). HEV and PiHEV are positioned to be most favourable 
as they closely resemble ICEV and are a requirement in the success of LCVs as 
technology matures and consumer confidence is achieved (Ahn, Jeong, and Kim 2008; 
Dagsvik et al. 2002; Greene, Duleep, and McManus et al. 2004; Shepherd, Bonsall, and 
Harrison 2012; Whalter et al.; 2010). Due to this, BEV are thought by many to not 
expect to gain significant market shares until around 2030, even in the most supportive 
policy regimes (Dagsvik et al.; 2002, Leiby and Rubin 1997; Mabit and Fosgerau 2011; 
Shepherd, Bonsall, and Harrison 2012) and dedicated CNG, LPG or biofuel ICEV are 
unlikely to achieve anything more than a niche market position (Ahn, Jeong, and Kim 
2008; Dagsvik et al. 2002; Janssen et al. 2006; Leiby and Rubin 1997). However, some 
studies suggest that there are some strong interactions between different types of LCVs, 
and their combined impact on emissions (EST 2007; Walther et al. 2010).  
Disaggregated studies showed a large heterogeneity in preferences when socio-
demographics are taken into account (Brownstone et al. 1996; Dagsvik et al. 2002; 
Potoglou and Kanaroglou 2007), but it is of note that none of these studies have explicit 
concerns of how the policies may impact across society. The concern that is addressed 
in this research is that because of this, many have recommended policies focused on 
achieving the objective for the study (i.e. emission reduction or market penetration), 
without assessing the costs they may impose on an individual level, taking an implicit 
utilititarian stance. We have already outlined our belief that policies should be adopted 
within an ethical framework that balances long term climate change concerns and short-
term prevention of inequalities that may arise from changes in the opportunity for car 
ownership and use. This study seeks to establish if this can be accounted for within a 
system dynamic model. 
Case Study Description 
The case study selected for this research is a recent example that considers the policy 
Regulation through a detailed and complex system dynamic model (Walther et al. 2010) 
of the Californian LEV and ZEV Regulations as described previously. The complexity 
of the model is partly due to the nature of the Regulations, in particular the ZEV 
classification and credit accounting system, which affects a multitude of feedbacks 
between the make-to-stock production supply chain and manufacturer adjustment 
behaviour to when motivated by incurred penalties4. Further to this,  sixteen different 
vehicle models are offered through four powertrain options (ICEV, HEV, PiHEV and 
BEV) and four segments based on vehicle weight and size (extra small (XS), small (S), 
medium (M) and large (L)).  On the demand side, the model links together a diffusion 
model with an interesting feature of consumer awareness and non-awareness through 
interaction with drivers of all 16 vehicle types (Struben and Sterman 2008) and discrete 
choice theory, utilising an established detailed customer choice model (Brownstone and 
Train 1999).  
This level of detail within the vehicle market allows for identification of potential GHG 
emissions reductions and the deduction of impacts on segments of society desired in 
order to incorporate the proposed ethical framework. Walther et al., use the model to 
assess different manufacturer strategies in meeting these regulations at lowest cost, 
incorporating vehicle or fleet adjustments of ICEV emissions and conservative or 
aggressive introduction of ZEVs (BEV and PiHEV) though we will not discuss their 
findings in this study, as they do not specifically relate to the ethical framework.  
 The model (illustrated in Figure 1) comprises of four modules. The Regulations module 
is designed to calculate credits and civil penalties through sales (from the Customer 
module) emissions and ranges of ZEVs (from the Industry module). These outputs feed 
in to the Industry module and combine with purchaser behaviour (from the Customer 
module) to predict adjustments in vehicle purchase prices and fuel consumptions and 
emissions from the GHG regulations, taking into account learning through experience.  
ZEV adjustment impacts are also calculated in the Industry module, taking into account 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that the model assumes an aggregate manufacturer response so that 
individual manufacturer responses are not included 
targets, actual sales, vehicle range, and costs of new technologies. Vehicle demand is 
calculated in the Customer module, as a function of population and income, with a 
purchase probability based on customer awareness (through marketing and ³GULYHU
interaction), vehicle availability, and utility feeding into the choice model. Both the 
Customer and Industry modules feed into the Infrastructure module, which models the 
interdependence of market share and network effects.  
 
Figure 1: Structure of the model (Source: Walther et al. 2010) 
 
A number of small additions to the original model were required in order to be able to 
retrieve the information required for this investigation. Firstly it was made possible that 
the GHG and ZEV penalties were able to be turned off in order to  FUHDWHD³QRSHQDOW\´
baseline, representative of a µBusiness as Usual¶ scenario without Regulation in place, 
as Walther et al. did not consider this scenario. Secondly, a reduction of BEV and 
PiHEV purchase cost at certain times to imitate a subsidy was included. Thirdly, it was 
made possible that the BEV models could become available at fixed dates rather than 
being conditional on infrastructure and range requirements. This was done to allow a 
fair comparison between certain policy interventions.  
All exogenous input data and endogenous feedback equations remained as developed by 
Walther et al., with the exception of the vehicle availabilities described in the next 
section.  Input parameters were established in conjunction with the international 
automobile manufacturer, Volkswagen, and the customer choice and technology 
diffusion is based on established literature. It was not our purpose to significantly 
develop or expand the model, but to use it as base to establish and run scenarios of 
interest in exploring our proposed ethical framework, a focus not taken by the original 
modellers. Further details of the model are included in Walther et al. (2010). 
Scenarios 
Two baselines are considered based on scenarios used by Walther et al. One represents 
a µFRQVHUYDWLYH¶LQWURGuction of ZEVs where their availability is dependent upon 
minimum infrastructural and technical (range) requirements (Conditional Baseline), and 
the other is an µDJJUHVVLYH¶LQWURGXFWLRQ, where ZEV models are available on the market 
at fixed dates (Fixed Baseline).  
The Conditional Baseline EHVWUHSUHVHQWVDµ'R1RWKLQJ¶VFHQDULRDQGFRPSDUHV
favourably with other predictions for California (Table 2), so can be used as a baseline 
for market share and emission impacts. However, it cannot be used for direct 
comparison to the policy scenarios¶ impact on vehicle costs because new vehicle 
models are introduced in response to regulation and subsidies, which makes it difficult 
to compare with the Conditional Baseline.  
 
 
SCENARIO 
2020 SALES MARKET SHARE (%) 
PiHEV BEV PiHEV + BEV 
Californian Plug-In Electric Vehicle Collaborative 
(McCarthy et al, 2010) N/A N/A 2 ± 6 
US Department of Energy 
(Balducci, 2008) N/A N/A ~ 10 
Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG, 2009) 29 2 31 
Conditional Baseline 9.34 1.91 11.25 
Fixed Baseline 22.1 16 38.1 
Table 2: ZEV market share of sales predictions in 2020 
 
It is recognised that the Fixed Baseline is not realistic as manufacturers are much more 
likely to carry out a conditional production strategy than to develop and release models 
at fixed times without any government intervention. In effect, the Conditional Baseline 
shows what would happen if no real effort were made to introduce new models, while 
the Fixed Baseline allows the filtering out of policy impacts while accounting for the 
effect of introducing new models at fixed times in response to or in anticipation of 
regulations.  
Three policy scenarios are tested, all of which have the same fixed introduction of 
models as the Fixed Baseline. The first is the Regulation policy, which the model was 
originally designed around, as explained previously in the case study description. Under 
Regulation, manufacturers are assumed to meet GHG targets through increased fuel 
efficiency in all vehicle classes. Second, the current Californian Rebate scheme of 
$1500 for PiHEV and $2500 for BEV for a 6-year period (as explained in Section 3) is 
tested in the Subsidy scenario. Finally, the two policy scenarios were combined into a 
Both Policies scenario. All input parameters are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
INPUT 
PARAMETER 
SCENARIO 
Conditional 
Baseline 
Fixed 
Baseline Subsidy Regulation 
Both 
Policies 
M
o
de
l A
v
a
ila
bi
lit
y 
(ye
a
r) 
ICEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
2010, 2000, 
2000, 2000 2010, 2000, 2000, 2000 
HEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
2014, 2012, 
2009, 2010 2014, 2012, 2009, 2010 
PiHEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
N/A, N/A,   
R(60), R(75) 2016, 2015, 2012, 2013 
BEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
I(0.5), I(0.6), 
R(200), R(400) 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 
Penalties on NO YES 
Subsidy 
($) 
PiHEV NO 1500 NO 1500 
BEV NO 2500 NO 2500 
Subsidy Duration  N/A 2011-2017 N/A 2011-2017 
Table 3: Scenario input parameters 
 
Model Findings 
The key outputs of this model that need to be identified and understood in order for the 
tested policies to satisfy the established ethical framework are GHG emission reductions 
(regarding long-term climate change targets), and vehicle market shares, vehicle 
ownership costs and GHG abatement costs to explore policy impacts on social 
inequalities. We do so by assuming that the four vehicle segments, XS, S, M and L can 
be taken to be proxy indicators of income. We recognise that this is not always the case, 
but defend this approach as a starting point that can be built upon in future work. 
GHG Emissions 
Significant reductions in GHG emissions are witnessed by 2020 under all policy 
scenarios compared to the Conditional Baseline, as shown in Figure 2 as the average 
fleet GHG emissions (including emissions from tailpipe and/or electricity production).  
 Figure 2: Average fleet GHG emissions (gGHGmile-1) for the policy scenarios 
 
Under the Subsidy scenario this is a reduction of around 35 gGHGmile-1 and under the 
Regulation and Both Policies scenarios, the reduction is around 80 gGHGmile-1. 
Assuming an average annual mileage of 15,000 miles per year5 and a lifetime of 10 
years6, this would equate to total savings of around 34 and 168 Mt GHG (respectively) 
from all new vehicles produced during the time period. The biggest emission reductions 
are made when Regulation is in place, as manufacturers are set a specific level to aim 
for within the model, and thus most emission reductions come from efficiencies made 
with ICE-based vehicles rather than introduction of BEVs. The Subsidy scenario does 
not meet current GHG targets by 2020, as there is no motivation for manufacturers to 
make efficiencies in ICEV, HEV or PiHEV.  
                                                 
5
 From registered cars, taken from the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
(http://apps.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/newsrel/media_center/california_ dmv_statistics.htm, 
accessed 15th March 2013 and Californian annual mileage (TSI 2009). 
6
 The model assumes an average vehicle life of 11 years (Walther et al 2010. We have assumed 
10 years so that our calculations are on the conservative side. 
Market Shares 
Figure 3 shows that compared to the Conditional Baseline, the policy scenarios result in 
more successful BEV and PiHEV new market shares. Under the Conditional Baseline, 
ICEV + HEV retains an almost 90% market share, which is reduced by nearly half with 
policies in place. The Regulation policy was more successful than the Subsidy policy, 
yielding 9.5% more PiHEVs and 17.8% more BEVs by 2020.  
 
Figure 3: Market share of sales of Zero Emission Vehicles (BEV + PiHEV) 
 
As shown in Table 4 there is only a 1% difference in market share between scenarios 
with and without subsidies in place.  Although the Fixed Baseline is not wholly realistic 
(as explained earlier), this could suggest that the introduction of models at specific 
times is more important than the Subsidy policy being in place. However, the increase 
due to subsidy is also relatively small when comparing between Both Policies and 
Regulation. Yet looking at the difference in shares in the last year of subsidy (2017), 
they are almost 10% greater in those scenarios with subsidies in place. In fact, this is the 
peak of the impact and when subsidies are removed, then the share of sales will drop as 
customers have to pay the full price as under other scenarios. Although this finding may 
initially suggest that subsidies are not effective, what it may indicate is that subsidies 
need to be stronger or applied for longer than those tested here to ensure that the 
learning curve is sustained and prices reduced in the long term. This result is a similar 
finding to Shepherd, Bonsall, and Harrison (2012) and an effect to be explored through 
sensitivity testing in future work. 
SCENARIO 
SALES MARKET SHARE (%) 
2017 2020 
PiHEV BEV PiHEV BEV 
Fixed Baseline 12.6 9.4 22.1 16.1 
Subsidy 13.1 10.4 22.4 16.2 
Regulation 13.7 11.3 24.2 19.0 
Both Policies 14.8 12.1 24.8 19.3 
Table 4: Market share of sales of PiHEV and BEV in 2017 and 2020 showing the effect 
of the subsidy that ended in 2017. 
 
As the California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project has been in place now for 3 years, the 
success of the scheme in reality can be compared to the model. By 2013, 10,036 BEV 
and 9, 234 PiHEV rebates have been issued. In the model, numbers are only available 
for year ends, but after the third year of subsidies under Both Policies, 8,765 BEV and 
3,411 PiHEV have been sold. Although BEV sales are similar, with the model slightly 
under predicting, PiHEV are a third of reality. These discrepancies could be due to the 
model having different dates of vehicle availability than in reality and slightly different 
time scales, as in the fourth year of the subsidies in the model we see the market really 
take off with sales of over 20,000 PiHEVs and nearly 30,000 BEVs.  
Cost of Ownership 
To further understand how certain sections of society may be affected by the LCV 
policies, attention now turns towards the changes in purchase prices over the time 
scales, shown in Table 5, where for simplicity, only the Fixed Baseline and Both 
Policies scenarios are given.  
VEHICLE 
SEGMENT 
PURCHASE PRICE ($) % DIFFERENCE 
between Fixed Baseline 
and Both Policies in 
2020 
2009 
2020 
Fixed 
Baseline 
Both 
Policies 
Average 19,964 22,079 25,580 15.8 
ICEV 19,964 21,014 26,958 28.3 
HEV n/a 19,880 23,481 18.1 
PIHEV n/a 21,769 23,809 9.37 
BEV n/a 28,861 29,302 1.53 
XS n/a 13,432 15,048 11.9 
S 12799 16,172 20,698 28.0 
M 17749 21,683 25,340 16.8 
L 27649 30,365 34,413 13.2 
Table 5: Weighted average powertrain and segment purchase prices.  
 
The majority of the price changes witnessed (relative to 2009) came from the 
introduction of ZEVs that are at a higher cost to begin with (due to being an immature 
technology with high battery costs). However, under the policy scenario, purchase costs 
of ICEV also rise due to the cost of technologies to reduce GHG emissions and potential 
manufacturer policies, which are generally passed on to the customer. The average 
overall price is 16% higher in 2020 under Both Policies than Fixed Baseline. The price 
differential between the policy and no-policy scenario for ICEV and HEV are much 
greater than those of the two ZEV models, particularly the BEV.  
What is of most concern from the point of view of this study is the price differential in 
segment sizes. Within the model, in order to meet GHG requirements, it is assumed that 
the manufacturer subjects each segment to the same relative reduction in emissions as 
the regulation is based on fleet average targets. In 2020, the Small-segment weighted-
average purchase price has increased disproportionately compared to other segments, 
leading to a downsizing to XS-segment and dis-incentivising downsizing from M and L 
segments. Thus, the greatest price increases compared to a no-regulation scenario will 
be in the smaller ICEV, which are potentially the most affordable form of LCV. These 
figures refer to new vehicles, which are most likely to be bought by more affluent 
members of society, and their decisions will then pass onto the second hand car market, 
reducing choice for these customers, who represent the majority of society, as (in the 
UK) less than 10% of car sales are new vehicles to private customers (SMMT 2013). 
Payback 
To understand the type of payback time that a typical driver may expect when 
purchasing an electric vehicle over a conventional vehicle, the details for a Medium 
segment vehicle of each powertrain in 2013, under Both Policies were taken from the 
model, and payback time was calculated using Equation (1). This is essentially the 
purchase price differential divided by the present value of running cost savings. As this 
uses undiscounted values we recognise the payback period will be an underestimate, but 
wished to keep to a simple illustrative method. 
ܻ݁ܽݎݏ݂݋ݎ݌ܽݕܾܽܿ݇ ൌ ௉஼ಾǡಳಶೇି௉஼ಾǡ಺಴ಶ൫ோ஼ಾǡ಺಴ಶିோ஼ಾǡಳಶೇ൯ൈ஺ெ                  (1) 7 
This optimistic method gives a payback period of 16.2 years, which means that it is 
unrealistic for a driver to change powertrains if motivated by economic reasons alone in 
the US. However, although purchase costs in the model are similar to UK prices, 
running costs are not. For ICEV, HEV and PiHEV, running costs are based on fuel costs 
alone, and these are approximately two fifths of UK petrol prices, and for BEV electric 
                                                 
7
 PCs,p= Purchase Cost segment, powertrain ($); M, ICE = 25,2567.94; M, BEV = 29,549.29; RCs,p= 
Running Cost segment, powertrain ($/mile); M, ICE = 0.0523; M, BEV = 0.0359; AM = annual 
mileage = 15,000. 
 
costs are approximately half of current UK electricity prices8. Adjusting for this, the 
payback time in the UK could be in the region of 4.5 years, a much more attractive 
proposition to the car buyer. 
Carbon Abatement Costs 
Finally, abatement costs were calculated for each policy measure, using cumulated 
discounted costs for customers, government and industry, and compared against the 
fixed baseline.  This was achieved using Equations (2) ± (6), a similar method to the EC 
³GHG 7UDQV3R5'´SURMHFW6KDGHHWDO 2011) and the well established McKinsey 
MAC curves (McKinsey 2007). ܣܾܽݐ݁݉݁݊ݐܥ݋ݏݐݏሺ ?Ȁݐ݋݊ሻ ൌ ஼ಷಳି஼ುሺ ?ሻாಷಳିாುሺ௧௢௡௦ሻ               (2)9 
ܩܪܩ݁݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊ݏ݂ݎ݋݉݊݁ݓݒ݄݈݁݅ܿ݁ݏ ൌ  ? ܧܨௌǡ௉ሺݐሻ ൈ ܰ ௌܸ௉ሺݐሻ ൈ ܣܯ ൈ ݈ௌǡ௉          (3)10 
ܸܰܲܷݏ݁ݎܥ݋ݏݐݏ ൌ   ? ௉஼௦ೄǤುሺ௧ሻൈே௏ೄǡುሺ௧ሻሺଵା௥ሻ೟ௌǡ௉ ൅   ? ሺோ஼ೄǤುሺ௧ሻൈே௏ೄǡುሺ௧ሻൈ஺ெሻሺଵା௥ሻ೟ௌǡ௉ǡ௧     (4)11 
                                                 
8 This is based on publically available prices on websites accessed on 15th March 2013: 
http://www.theaa.com/motoring_advice/fuel 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm? t=epmt_5_3. 
http://www.energy.eu/.  
9
 CFB = Costs under Fixed Baseline; CP = Costs under Policy Scenario; EFB = Total GHG 
Emissions from new vehicles under Fixed Baseline; EP = Total GHG Emissions from new 
vehicles under Policy Scenario 
 
10
 EFS,P (t) = emission factor (gGHG/mile) of new vehicles in each segment/powertrain in year t; 
NV
 S,P (t)  = number of new vehicles in each new segment/powertrain in year t; AM = 
annual mileage = 15,000 (see previous footnote); l = vehicle lifetime (assumed to be 10 
years). 
 
ܸܰܲܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐܥ݋ݏݐݏ ൌ  ? ௌ௨௕௦௜ௗ௜௘௦ሺ௧ሻሺଵା௥ሻ೟௧                (5) 
ܸܰܲܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܥ݋ݏݐݏ ൌ   ? ூ௡ௗ௨௦௧௥௬஼௢௦௧௦ିூ௡ௗ௨௦௧௥௬ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘ሺଵା௥ሻ೟௧     (6) 
Table 6 shows the discounted costs and emissions of all vehicles bought up to 2020, for 
the policy scenarios compared to Fixed Baseline and corresponding abatement costs are 
shown in Table 7. With Subsidies, users effectively benefit by $1165 per ton of GHG 
removed, but at the expense of 1216 $/ton from Government and 138 $/t from Industry.  
This is because the emission savings from the policy of Subsidy alone are relatively 
small compared to the Fixed Baseline and many users are being subsidised to purchase 
vehicles that would have been purchased anyway as shown in the Fixed Baseline. The 
policy options of Regulation or Both Policies yield abatement costs more in line with 
other studies.  
 
SCENARIO 
COSTS ($b) Emission 
Reduction 
(MtGHG) 
Users Government Industry Overall Purchase Running 
Subsidy -0.95 -0.18 1.18 0.13 0.18 0.97 
Regulation 50.66 -28.58 0.00 -1.05 21.03 134.95 
Both Policies 49.38 -28.68 1.35 -0.93 21.11 135.57 
Table 6: Change in discounted costs ($b) and emission savings (MtGHG) of policies by 
2020 (cf Fixed Baseline) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
11
 PCs (t) = Purchase cost of new vehicle after subsidy ($) in each segment/powertrain in year t; r = 
discount factor = 0.02 (As used within the model. This is consistent with the US discount 
factor at the time the model was developed); t = number of years since 2009; NB:  Industry 
costs are the negative of profits. 
 
SCENARIO 
CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS ($/tGHG) 
Users Government Industry Overall 
Subsidy -1165.86 1216.12 137.37 187.63 
Regulation 163.62 0.00 -7.78 155.84 
Both Policies 152.67 9.95 -6.88 155.74 
Table 7: Abatement costs of policies in $/t (cf Fixed Baseline) 
 
Although direct comparisons are not possible, urban policy measures studied in GHG-
TransPoRD (Schade et al, 2011) have abatement costs between -1159 and ¼1229 ¼tCO2 
from a user perspective, -DQG¼W&22  from an authority perspective and -600 
DQG¼W&22 from a social perspective. Road technology abatement costs for users  
range  between -¼516 (for BEVs) and ¼106 IRU&1*/3*¼W&22  . Under our 
Regulation only scenario, users bear 164 $/tGHG whereas government have no direct 
costs and Industry benefit  -8$/tGHG. Whilst these values appear reasonable per ton of 
GHG removed, the users incur an additional spend in the region of $50b on purchasing 
vehicles and only save around $28b from fuel savings under the Regulation policies. 
The manufacturers have passed on the cost of technology improvements to the 
consumer and see an increase in their profits of around $1b (or 8%) from selling the 
higher priced vehicles. Industry has a $130m (1%) decrease in profit under Subsidy 
only, and while the overall change in costs for consumers is small when subsidies are 
applied, they are benefiting only a small share of the consumers, most seeing a 
significant increase in purchase prices. Thus combining policies distributes cost burdens 
only at the margin but does lower overall abatement costs.  
Policy Recommendations and Implications 
Ensure Affordability. 
An overall fleet average emission target may favour owners of larger vehicles if a 
manufacturer chooses to respond by proportional emission reductions as assumed in this 
model. As we assume that segments are related to income, this may therefore favour 
richer segments of society. Moreover, it is smaller ICEV that look to experience the 
greatest increase in purchase cost under the regulations, and these are the potentially 
most affordable from of LCV. Further research will be needed to establish if this is due 
to basic model assumptions of business strategies or within the Regulation itself, but 
could require amendments analogous to existing affordability regulations in the utility 
sector for those experiencing fuel and water poverty.  
If this trend continues into the second hand car market (which we assume it will to a 
noticeable extent), the poorest may have to keep an older less efficient vehicle, which 
will counteract GHG concerns and have running costs implications for the owner. 
Further to this, they may no longer have the opportunity or realistic aspiration to own a 
car of any type due to higher average costs. The most affluent in society are perhaps the 
most likely to be purchasing new cars and be realistically and justifiably able to bear 
these higher purchase costs, however if prices do rise by 16% then some will move to 
the second hand car market, reducing the new car market. This could have many knock 
on effects such as increase residual values and a longer average vehicle life. It may be 
that different ownership models, such as car clubs, could be used to overcome the 
ownership issue and should perhaps be given greater support, but we do not directly 
consider them in our study.  
Protect Vulnerability 
Segments of society with special claims for car ownership need protection from 
disproportionate increases in purchase cost or decrease in utility. In order to achieve the 
emission targets and introduce LCVs, we have discovered in our model that market 
shares of ICEV + HEV will be reduced greatly from what they are today. Though this is 
desirable, as we wish to reduce emissions, our ethical framework dictated that the most 
vulnerable (in terms of mobility) require protection. Even if it is assumed that such a 
significant change in purchase habits in just over a decade is realistic, it is unlikely that 
LCV attributes will have improved sufficiently to equal ICEV, particularly in terms of 
costs. Under this assumption, those segments who have most reliance on car ownership 
will be most impacted, as they may be priced out from owning a vehicle suiting their 
needs or bear high costs because of their needs by the introduction of these policies, and 
thus could qualify for protection from the negative impacts on mobility which are 
indicated within the model. Further to this, the model suggests that significant 
downsizing may occur without necessarily providing cost savings. This has ethical 
implications for those customers who may require a larger vehicle (eg larger families). 
Distribute Burdens 
This research found that customers bore the highest costs of the market transformation 
when Regulation is in place. Although customers should expect to bear some costs as 
car ownership does not outweigh climate change obligations, they should be more 
equally shared, particularly by industry who pass on a significant amount of their 
incurred penalties to the customer. The subsidies tested here, which reduced customer 
costs, were not strong enough to make a noticeable impact to market share, a similar 
finding to Shepherd, Bonsall, and Harrison (2012). A recent UK report that suggested 
the significant amount spent on the Plug-in Vehicle Program has only benefited a 
µKDQGIXO¶RIPRWRULVWV3DUOLDPHQWThe Chief Executive of Jaguar Land Rover 
has also recently spoken out against these subsidies that DUHµRQO\IRUWKHULFK¶(The 
Guardian, 5th March 2013), as the high up-front payment and access to off-street 
parking are required to purchase an EV.   
This is perhaps more concerning as the EV owner now benefits from low running costs, 
and is directly analogous to the feed-in tariffs offered with solar panels which due to 
their high purchase price and the need to own your own home are only accessible to the 
wealthier members of society. In both these cases, the tax payer is subsidising the well 
off at the expense of the less well off (or those without access) to bring down 
production costs of a technology which will it is argued benefit the whole of society in 
the longer term.  This is though dependent on the lifetime of residual value of batteries 
in BEV and PiHEV (not needing replacement after 8 years) and availability of off-street 
charging facilities.  
Conclusion 
It is relevant to note at this point that some aspects of this research are restrcited by 
parameters of the case study itself. Exploring these model limitations and suggested 
amendments may lead to a model that more accurately reflect the dynamic nature of 
technological development and demand response, and so be able to make more 
appropriate policy recommendations. Firstly, it must be remembered that this model 
only represents purchases of new cars, not the second-hand car market. This is 
important as those who buy second hand cars are usually the less well off segments of 
society, many of which may not have access to off-street parking required for charging 
points. The interaction between new and second hand cars, and the responses of both 
manufacturer and customer would be very relevant to include but unfortunately there 
are few models that do explicitly consider the 2nd hand car market. Additionally, as the 
model is set up to mimic an aggregate manufacturer rather than be representative of the 
automobile industry with individual players, there is no consideration of competing 
manufacturer strategies, which has been attempted in a recent model (Boksgerger et al. 
2012). 
Of particular concern, there are a fixed number of customers in this model, which not 
alone fails to capture market growth but also UHVWULFWVWKHDELOLW\RIFXVWRPHUVWRµGURS
RXW¶RIWhe market. In addition, the model assumes all choices are relevant for all 
consumers. Future models should consider restricting the choice set of certain segments 
of society, for example for those without access to home charging points or high 
mileage users. These people may already be in categories of higher need (with no home 
charging likely to be poorer due to housing type and high travel commitment would 
indicate greater reliance on car ownership) and would therefore be disproportionately 
affected. Incorporating identifiable segments, such as by income or need would allow a 
policy maker to understand where inequalities could occur. 
Within any model expansion, it is recommended to extend the time period and in doing 
so consider other LCV technologies and fuels, such as hydrogen fuel cells. This would 
also require amendment of the ethical framework as claims for car ownership will alter 
as technology, model options and attitudes develop. Also related to this, it would be 
more accurate for the model to incluGH*+*HPLVVLRQVDV³:HOOWR:KHHO´RUOLIHF\FOH
emissions, rather than tailpipe only. This is a move currently being given much 
consideration by the EU for fleet emission regulations (EC 2012b).  
In conclusion, the concern of this work is that governments may be obliged to reduce 
GHG emissions due to climate change, but policies to achieve this via new passenger 
cars could negatively impact on inequality in society. Overall the findings here have 
demonstrated the complicated feedbacks that exist within car ownership. It was found 
that putting regulatory penalties in place would achieve the greatest GHG emission 
reductions but this also imposes large costs on customers, which are disproportionate 
across market segments. Subsidies tested here reduce user costs but are not as 
successful in reducing emissions and may only benefit the more affluent in society who 
may also benefit from reduced operating costs. However, when combined, these 
policies can lower overall abatement costs. This appears to defend a claim that 
governments are indeed obliged to introduce such policies, but also that stronger 
policies are needed for the substantial reductions required and, as the opportunity for car 
ownership is affected disproportionately, some policy amendments will be required.  
As such, for policies to satisfy an ethical framework that seeks to strike a balance 
between climate change concerns and protecting claims for car ownership, three key 
policy recommendations have been made. Firstly, there must be provision in the policy 
to ensure affordability of car ownership (due to the societal and infrastructural lock-in 
of car-dependence), but this should not purposefully favour those already most well off. 
Following this, policies must seek to protect those who may have special claims 
towards car ownership and are therefore most vulnerable to changes in the opportunity 
for car ownership. Finally, policy makers should be aware of where the costs related to 
policy interventions are falling, between customers, government and industry, and make 
certain that burdens are fairly distributed. Two policy measures related to LCV uptake 
were considered in this study, subsidy and regulation, both of which are being strongly 
favoured in both Europe and America. It is the recommendation of this study that they 
are appropriate mechanisms if they are implemented together and monitored subject to 
the above recommendations. 
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Acronyms 
BEV ± Battery Electric Vehicle 
DfT ± Department for Transport 
EU ± European Union 
GHG ± Greenhouse Gas 
HEV ± Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
ICEV ± Internal Combustion Engine vehicle (conventionally fuelled) 
L - Large segment of vehicles  
LCV- Low Carbon Vehicle 
M ± Medium segment of vehicles 
PiHEV ± Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
S ± Small segment of vehicles 
XS ± Extra Small segment of vehicles 
ZEV- Zero Emission Vehicle 
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